that he does not appreciate the teleological nature of even the higher human activities. Most of the organicists are content to use the teleological categories, such terms as function, service, purpose, good, goal, end, value, success and failure, adaptation, as indispensable aids in thinking of biological phenomena, without imputing teleological activities to the organisms, holding or hoping that in the end physico-chemical principles, such as the *Gestalt* principle, will suffice to explain them all. Goldstein goes further than most in emphasizing the appearances of teleological activity, while denying the validity of both mechanistic and teleological explanation.

The four authors (Ritter, Alverdes, Bertalanffy, and Goldstein) whose holistic views we have rapidly sketched in this chapter, represent a large proportion of contemporary biologists; but there are other forms of holistic doctrine to be considered. Before passing on to these let us summarily bring together the main points common to these four authors and some difficulties and objections that lie against them.

They all insist on the following:

(1) The total untenability of the machine-theory of organisms and of such theories of development as Weismann's.

(2) They agree that the expression * living matter' is an improper one; for, they say, there are no pieces of living matter, but only living organisms.

(3) They all are agreed in repudiating Vitalism (the postulation of some guiding agency of radically different nature from any recognized by contemporary physics

and chemistry),
(4) They all repudiate teleological activity as a causally
efficacious factor in the life of organisms ; but they insist